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Ideal and Practice in a State Constitution: The Case of Minnesota
MILLARD L. GIESKE 1
University of Minnesota, Morris
Minnesota badly needs a revised constitution that generally and broadly defines and distributes
powers, responsibilities and rights, and sets up a general frame of government. While this
might be accomplished through the amendment process, it has been painfully slow and up to
now inadequate to meet 'the needs for modern, flexible and responsive state government. A
constitutional convention may still be the best and most practical way of achieving needed
revisions.

A Constitution Defined

Americans have always been preoccupied with written constitutions much more than their English ancestors. In the case of American states this preoccupation
has not been an unmixed blessing. Continual tampering, changing and modification has become a commonplace of American state politics. Minnesota, like its sister commonwealths, has been a party to the confusing
pressure and flow of state constitutional politics. Since
the end of World War II there has been an increasing
demand from Minnesota's citizens, political parties, interest groups and citizen organizations, to change and
modify its constitution, judging by the number of proposed amendments submitted to the voting public. In
1947 the state legislature2 created a special Constitutional Commission of Minnesota to "study and consider
the constitution in relation to political, economic and
social changes and developments which have occurred
and which may occur" and in 1948 the Commission
made public its Report of the Constitutional Commission
of Minnesota. From 1948 to 1962 some 29 amendments
have been submitted to the state's voters for acceptance
or rejection, many of a highly important and controversial nature. And in 1964 the so-called Taconite Amendment, the most controversial amendment in several generations, is to be submitted to the voters.
What is a Constitution? While all citizens are very
likely to make reference to "the constitution", still the
intended use of the word varies widely. Some revere the
word as though it refers to a document created by divine
providence. Others think of it as a people's document
that must of necessity be subject to frequent and continual change and modification. The pitfall of defining a
constitution is that different people and different groups
have different uses for a constitution and therefore are
likely to want it to conform to their own likes and wellbeing.
Admitting and accepting the pitfalls of defining such
an instrument of government, it is still well to keep in
mind the necessity of having a working definition of the
word. In the American sense, a constitution is a "document in which are set out the rules governing the comB.A., magna cum laude, 1953, Hamline University. Attended
Wayne University, 1954-55. B.S., M.A., 1957, University of
Minnesota. Instructor, Richfield High School, 1960-62. Since
1962, Instructor, University of Minnesota, Morris.
2
Chapter 614, Laws of Minnesota, 1947.
1
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position, powers, and methods of operation of the main
institutions of government, and the general principles
applicable to their relations to the citizens" (Jennings,
1947:32-3). Another way of defining it is to declare a
constitution "The organic and fundamental law of a
nation or state, which may be written or unwritten, establishing the character and conception of its government, laying the basic principle to which its internal life
is to be conformed, organizing the government, and regulating, -distributing, and limiting the functions of its
different departments, and prescribing the extent and
manner of the exercise of sovereign powers" (Black,
1951). The difficulty, however, in defining a constitution
is that in actual practice such an instrument may contain as much or as little as its framers feel is necessary
and desirable to achieve the ends of government. From
the standpoint of flexibility and ease of use, a constitution should avoid extraneous detail and, instead, contain
a broad general framework of the institutions of government, setting forth its powers and functions, the rights
of citizens and claims that citizens may make against the
government. It is this kind of constitution that was created by the original and later "framers" of the Constitution of the United States. And it is precisely because the
states, including Minnesota, have not followed this practice or understanding in framing their respective constitutions that they have become over involved in continually flexing and stretching their constitutions, in order
to make them work, through a rash of annual and biennial amendments that would otherwise be unnecessary.
Constitutions, of course, do change and there is a continual need to make them workable under conditions
that did not prevail in an earlier generation or decade.
They may be amended through popular ratification of
the voting citizens or by conventions called under the
authority of the constitution. But they are also amended
by custom, a fact that Americans too frequently overlook. And they can be amended by the national government through amendments to the national Constitution,
or by decisions of the Supreme Court, in such landmark
cases as Baker v. Carr,3 in which the Court, in effect,
3
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). This decision was in
part anticipated by a case that originated in the Minnesota federal district court in Magraw v. Donovan, 159 F. Supp. 901
(1958) in which the federal court retained jurisdiction until the
legislature had an opportunity to reapportion, which it did in
1959.
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either amends state constitutions, the customs of interpreting them or forbids enforcing provisions of them.
The Needs of a Constitution

Americans pride themselves on being a pragmatic
people. They point with pride to the fact that the national Constitution, which was written in 1789, has
served for 175 years with but 24 amendments to it, and
half that number if the Bill of Rights and the eleventh
and twelfth amendments are considered so close to the
original document as to be almost a part of it. The late
W. F. Willoughby once declared that there were two major considerations in drawing constitutions: A constitutional system, he said, should contain two things that at
first blush seem to be opposites: stability and flexibility
(Willoughby, 1936: 129-31). Stability because social and
political progress cannot be made when the fundamental
law is undergoing constant modification. Flexibility because the conditions that a government must meet are
subject to constant change and modification. These
seemingly opposite needs can best be met by framing a
constitution in such a way that great freedom of action
can be obtained under the document without impairing
its basic character, and when the occasional need arises
where greater change is necessary then the document
can be formally amended. Willoughby placed greater
reliance on the first method of creating a constitution
that "can be bent without breaking, one that can be
adjusted to new conditions without undergoing any structural change" (Willoughby, 1936: 131-32). Thus, the
really stable constitution becomes the flexible constitution that adjusts to new conditions and new demands
without a general overhauling or specific new grant of
power for some immediate need or change in public
policy.
It is in this sense that the federal Constitution has
stood the test so well. It is general, restrained, flexibleand, of great importance to the citizen, basically understandable. To be sure, the complete student of the Constitution must go beyond it and know the great decisions
of the Supreme Court and the customs which, in practice, have modified it. But even a general reading of the
document taxes neither the time nor the patience of the
citizen. The Constitution has weathered great domestic,
international, financial, social and political crises with a
minimum of discomforture, with the possible exception
of civil rights.
It is when the student of constitutional government
turns to the states that real problems begin to arise. For
generality, stability and flexibility, the states have substituted rigidity, particularity and minutiae to the point
where state constitutions have become not much more
than legal codes meaningful not to the layman but the
lawyer. "States' rights" in its noninterpositional sense
have been sacrificed to narrow definitions of state power
with needed powers so divided and circumscribed that
viable and responsible government at the state level, if
not impossible, is nevertheless highly improbable.
In brief, then, a constitution, to remain stable and
flexible, should do three main things: First, it should set
52

out the broad outlines of state government by defining
and establishing its basic institutions and branches. Second, it should define and grant broadly the powers that
the government needs to carry out the services and safeguards that the citizenry expects or may expect at some
future time from the government. Third, it should state
the basic rights and claims that the citizen may make
against the government and its officers. A good constitution should be brief, readable to the layman, representative of what the people want or are likely to want
from government, and reflecting the emerging needs and
problems of mass urban living. 4 A document that fails
in these particulars contributes to the frustration and
probably the political alienation which are all too common in mass American politics.
The Minnesota Constitution in Perspective

The Minnesota Constitution, written in 1958, is
slightly older than the typical state constitution which is
now 84 years old and was written in 1880. Only ten
states have older constitutions than Minnesota. 5 The
approximately 15,059 words in the Minnesota Constitution is slightly less than the national average of 22,518
words for the 50 states. Two states, however, California
and Louisiana, with 70,000 and 217,000 words respectively, have exceedingly long constitutions and this obviously skews the national average. The average, excluding Louisiana, is 18,550; excluding both California and
Louisiana the average drops to 17,475 words. The Minnesota Constitution thus comes very close to being near
the national average in length. By way of comparison to
the national constitution, the Minnesota Constitution is
two and one quarter times as long, and occupies some
18 pages in the Legislative Manual (Bluebook) as compared to the eight pages necessary for the Constitution
of the United States. The shortest state constitution is
Vermont's with 4,840 words. By grouping state constitution in terms of length, the following distribution is
found:
less than 5,000
5,000 to 9,999
10,000 to 14,999
15,000 to 24,999
25,000 to 34,999
over 35,000

1 state(s)
7
12
20
4
6

Neither length nor age is as important as the content
found in a constitution and the care that has gone into
writing it.
Writing Minnesota's Constitution. Minnesota is unique
in that it is the only state that has two original constitutions. The state's only constitutional convention was convened in St. Paul on July 13, 1857. Because of the intense feeling that existed between Republican and Dem• For a discussion of the needs of a state constitution, see
Fellman, 1960: 137-58.
5
Data for state by state comparisons is taken from The Book
of the States for 1962-63 and is complete through the year 1961.
The ten states with older constitutions are Conn., Ind., Iowa,
Me., Mass., N.H., Ohio, R.I., Vt., and Wisc.
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ocratic delegates to that convention, the two groups almost immediately broke up into separate deliberating
bodies and each went its separate way. Each drafted a
separate constitution. 6 The near impossibility of submitting two separate constitutions to the voters and the
Congress finally persuaded the separate drafting conventions to work out a compromise. Both conventions then
appointed five members each to a conference committee.
The committee of ten nearly broke up over the question
of Negro suffrage which was demanded by the Republican members who, by and large, represented the more
radical views of the two conventions. So strong were
opinions held that on one occasion a fist fight broke out
over the question and two members were expelled, so
that the actual drafting of the compromise document
rested with eight members. After ten days of intense
effort, the document was ready for submission to the
two rump conventions and, on August 28, both conventions, with much bitterness, approved the compromise
document.
"From this brief resume of the proceedings of the
conventions of 1857 it must be evident to all that the
original state Constitution was not drawn up in that calm
and deliberate manner which is essential to a good result," Anderson (1927:193) wrote in 1927. This is a
question that Minnesota citizens might well ponder in
the 1960's when the state Constitution is viewed as not
needing serious and deliberate revision because of the
original framers "success" in reaching the great compromise of 1858.
The Minnesota governor. Modern state government
needs responsible leadership from the office of governor.
One of the vagaries of the Minnesota Constitution is the
statement in Article III that the "powers of government
shall be divided into three distinct departments-legislative, executive, and judicial ... " The separation of powers is commonly considered a basic principle of American government yet in the Article V clauses of the Minnesota Constitution, provision is not made for a truly
"executive department" but, instead, the power is divided
among a group of executives, including the governor,
lieutenant governor, secretary of state, auditor, treasurer and attorney general. Without policy coordination
through a single, elected chief executive, Minnesota cannot expect to achieve responsible executive government.
Administrative reorganization measures that took place
in 1939 and afterward will continue to be inadequate
until the governor and executive department is centered
in a chief executive responsible singly to the voters. Reports such as the Little Hoover Commission in 1950 and
the Minnesota Self Survey of 1955-56 will not bring
about a more successful and efficient administration, nor
will there be coordinated policy development until the
sanguine warfare within the executive departments is
ended constitutionally. The executive budget, while aiding the governor in policy coordination, is a poor substitute for a truly responsible executive leader. Plural exec• For the story of the drafting of the constitutions, see Anderson and Lobb, 1921: 42-132; and Anderson, 1927: 189-92.
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utive leadership serves to confuse the voters and probably adds to political alienation. It also tends to personalize politics by projecting images of certain elected officials to the public and, in the process, undermining political party responsibility that, in turn, further weakens
responsible leadership ..
The modern legislature. The manner in which Article
IV, section 2, prescribes the apportionment of members
of the state legislature sets no practical limits on the size
of the legislature. Minnesota thus has the largest Senate
in the union with 67 members, and its 135 members in
the House also is large, except by comparison with the
northeastern states where the New England towns serve
as a basis for representation. Some practical method of
limiting the size of the legislature is necessary, perhaps
basing it upon a population standard as recommended
by the Report of the Constitutional Commission in 1948.
Minnesota could well reduce the size of its legislature
and increase the compensation for the legislators.
Since 1877 the state has had biennial sessions, subject
to the call by the governor of special sessions (Article
V, section 4). When the scope and importance of the
state's business is considered, the constitutional limitation of this policy setting function to 90 days, or 120
days as the recent 1962 amendment allows, is of questionable validity. The state budget now approximates
$600 million annually. There is not a corporation anywhere that would think of limiting its board of directors
to meetings every odd-numbered year which cannot be
extended beyond 120 days. Yet the Constitution sets
such limits upon the transacting of state business by the
legislature, a reflection of the old 19th century suspicion
that the people's representatives could not be trusted in
longer sessions. Those who pay for this constitutional
penalty are the state's citizens because much needed
legislation is either passed in haste, or is manipulated
and emasculated in conference committees under pressure of legislative deadlines. And opponents of legislation strive mightily to bottle up legislation knowing full
well that if their dilatory tactics are successful enough
there will be insufficient time to consider these matters
and the legislation will die a quiet but painless death.
It is debatable whether there ever was a need for this
type of restriction upon legislative powers. Even if there
was, the state now has reached the point where it cannot ignore the importance of its legislative business, nor
can it delay its substantive decision making to a biennial
basis. Counties do not do this. Cities and villages cannot do this. Like cities, villages and counties, the state
deals both directly and daily with its three and one half
million citizens. It should not be limited to this dated
and outworn restriction. Limits of any kind upon the
length of time that the legislature can meet seems illogical in the press of urgent affairs of state and a $600 million budget. The lack of a constitutionally set adjournment date would still not preclude the legislative leadership from setting a workable adjournment date as a goal
toward which to strive.
Another highly questionable feature of the Minnesota
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Constitution, and one that unnecessarily ties the hands
of the legislature, is the restriction on the use of tax
revenues. Approximately three-fourths of all state taxes
are dedicated to special uses, some by constitutional restriction, others by statute. The result is that in some
years one fund has a surplus of revenue while another
is starved. The development of a comprehensive and
coordinated budget that adequately considers the impact
of taxes on the state economy is thwarted in both the
drawing of an executive budget and its passage by the
legislature. The use of dedicated funds puts into a fiscal strait jacket the legislative powers over the budget.
The legislature has become the fiscal captive of the Constitution: investment of permanent school and swamp
funds (Art. VIII, section 4), investment of university
funds (Art. VIII, sec. 5), the mining occupation tax
(Art. IX, sec. lA), the motor fuels tax (Art. IX, sec.
5), the details of the handling of state debt ( Art. IX,
sec. 6), the highway user tax distribution fund (Art.
XVI, Sec. 5), the trunk highway fund (Art. XVI, sec.
6), the county state-aid highway fund ( Art. XVI, sec.
7), the taxation of motor vehicles and motor fuel ( Art.
XVI, sec. 9 and 10)-all limit the power of the legislature to determine the distribution and use of state taxes
-to cite some but not all the examples of how the legislature is not the master of its own fiscal responsibility.
What can and should be noted is that nearly all funds
that are dedicated to a specific use by the Constitution
were given such status because powerful (and perhaps
well meaning) special interest groups championed them.
By way of comparison, Article I, section 8, of the Constitution of the United States says simply that "The Congress shall have power: To lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for
the common defense and general welfare of the United
States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform through the United States; To borrow money on
the credit of the United States," and, finally, to "promote
postoffices and postroads." Beyond that there is no real
limitation placed upon the Congress except to state that
no military appropriation shall be for a period longer
than two years, that "direct taxes" shall be apportioned
among the states by population, and the grant of power
under Article 16 to impose an income tax.
These are some but not all the weaknesses of the Minnesota Constitution. Section 12 of Article IX even goes
to the trouble of stating that if any person converts the
state school fund to his own use, this is embezzlement
and a punishable felony, as though the legislature were
incapable of reaching a similar determination of felonious activity! Or consider the difficulty of the layman and
non-lawyer, the person who has not the time to study
excessive detail, when be seeks to understand the Constitution and then comes to sub-division 3, section 6, of
Article IX:
"No such certificates shall be issued with respect to any
fund when the amount thereof with interest thereon to
maturity, added to the then outstanding certificates
against the same fund and interest thereon to maturity,
will exceed the then unexpended balance of all moneys
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which will be credited to that fund during the biennium
under existing laws; except that the maturities of any
such certificates may be extended by refunding to a date
not later than December 1 of the first full calendar year
following the biennium in which such certificates were
issued. If moneys on hand in any fund are not sufficient
to pay all non-refunding certificates of indebtedness
issued on such fund during any biennium and all certificates refunding the same, plus interest thereon, which
are outstanding on December 1 immediately following
the close of such biennium, the state auditor shall levy
upon all taxable property in the state a tax collectible in
the then ensuing year sufficient to pay the same on or
before December 1 of such ensuing year, with interest
to the date or dates of payment." Under the heavy burden of such verbiage the Constitution becomes not a
document of citizens but a missile of lawyers.
Size and apportionment of the legislature are still another important consideration of the Constitution. It
would seem that a legislature should generally reflect and
be representative of the population without the artificial coloration by that time worn tool of majorities and
even individuals in legislatures, the gerrymander. No
scheme of apportionment is likely to be perfect, nor can
it be. But it would serve the state's citizens well if the
matter of control over apportionment, as reflected in
Article IV, section 2, were entirely removed from those
who are most affected by its outcome, i.e., the legislators
themselves. The Constitution should set up the general
conditions and methods by which reapportionment is
effected, but the instrumentation of it should be beyond
the reach of those whose careers it may injure. A re-apportionment commission might be appointed made up
of judges, party representatives and the general public,
which could formulate as equitably as possible a systematic allotment of seats without consideration to the
advantages of either incumbents or parties. This is necessary now both because of the greatly changing pattern of
the state's population, and, also, because of the new role
being played by the federal courts under the 14th amendment.
Although essentially not a constitutional problem, if
a full-time legislature is necessary, then its compensation scales must be radically updated. An $8,000 or a
$10,000 annual salary for a full-time and "professional"
legislature is not a poor investment for citizens, and the
total cost of such an increase could be easily absorbed
i£ the unwieldly size of the senate and house were reduced to a more workable level. In terms of occupations
found within the legislature, a quick and summary examination of the legislative manual indicated a great
over-representation of certain forms of employment lawyers, farmers and certain limited classes of businessmen - so that the legislative point of view is heavily
weighted with particular occupational prejudices. A full
time legislature, with a compensation scale that would
allow more widespread participation by other income and
occupational groups, while it likely would not greatly
change the occupational category of most legislators,
would encourage those outside the few groups presently
The Minnesota Academy of Science

favored to seek legislative service with less chance of
economic consequence and penalty.

The state courts. The election of judges is a relic of
the Jacksonian era. It will be noted, however, that when
the Constitutional Commission of Minnesota made its
report in 1948 it retained the selection of judges by popular election. By and large, elections of judges are unimportant. Most vacancies are filled by gubernatorial
appointment, for the incumbent normally resigns from
office, according to the custom and "code" of the judiciary, or is removed by death; in either case the vacancy
is filled by appointment. Since elections are not normally important, and since the state bar association plays
an important role in the selection process, it would seem
that this custom should be written into the Constitution.
The judicial article should be amended to provide for
the creation of a nonpartisan commission that would select a slate of qualified judicial candidates. Actual nomination would still be made by the governor but from
the slate of prospective judges and based on whatever
other qualifications he deemed desirable. In this manner
the general meaninglessness of judicial elections could
be eliminated, conformity to the true practice of judicial
selection would be obtained, as well as possible improvement through the use of a judicial commission to aid in
the selection of qualified personnel. In the 1962 general
elections, of the ten judicial districts in the state, only
in the fourth and sixth districts was there an election
contest; in the first, six candidates for the five judgeships
were selected,7 and in the second, four candidates for
two judgeships. In every instance the incumbent judge
was reelected. A basic weakness of electing judges is the
potential effect it has upon voters. The voter knows little
or nothing about the judge: he does not run on a platform; few citizens know his record or the number of his
decisions that are overturned on appeal; and his legal
competence and judicial temper are unknown qualities
to the vast number of voters. Nor do judges make election speeches. The result is that the voter can validly
say and probably think that it really does not matter if
he votes, and this can contribute to the feeling of political alienation that too many voters experience.
Local government. Since the adoption of amended
Article XI in 1958, the brightest part and most updated
feature of the state Constitution relates to the matter of
local government. In substance, and in many instances
in the exact wording of the article, the legislature and
the voters have adopted the recommendations of the
1948 Constitutional Commission of Minnesota. The article is concise and the legislature is given ample power
to effect change and consolidation which are or may be
necessary with the shifting population and growing needs
of the large metropolitan area that is developing within
the state. At the same time adequate powers of home
rule are maintained for the local units of government.
7
When one incumbent died, his successor was appointed by
the governor; the courts later ruled that a candidate who filed
for the judgeship and was the seeming winner could not under
the law be a candidate for the office held by the appointee.
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There is one feature concerning local government and
the legislature that may at some future time require serious reconsideration. That concerns the matter of consolidation of municipal governments into a "federal"
system of city government that may at some future time
be necessary for effective and efficient administration. In
a metropolitan area, however, such as Minneapolis-St.
Paul and their suburbs-the "standard metropolitan statistical area" in the words of the United States Bureau
of the Census-with several hundred local units of government, it might prove-indeed, it likely would proveimpossible to obtain the approval of each affected local
unit of government. When the Canadian metropolitan
government for the area surrounding Toronto was created, it was done solely by the action of the provincial
parliament or legislature, and the local units· were not
allowed the right of veto. This, obviously, runs counter
to the practice of local autonomy but, in the future, assuming that some form of federal municipal government
becomes necessary and desirable, the only practical way
of solving the vexing problem may be through action of
the legislature. In defense of the right of the state, legislature alone to act in such a case, it can be argued that
the state government of necessity is concerned in matters
where governmental affairs cross as many as five and six
counties.
The Constitution: Individuals Versus Groups

One of the great and vexing problems of government
and politics is whether politics should be based on individual needs and responsibilities or whether, in fact,
politics is essentially an exercise in group dynamics. One
of the 18th and 19th century American myths, and probably a 20th century one as well, . is that government
should serve the public interest of "the People." When
there is talk of "the People," reference is normally made
to a collection of individuals who in some Rousseauean
and mystical manner arrive at collective decisions
through their "will." Lincoln captured this most eloquently when he declared that government "of, by and
for" the people ought to prevail.
In fact, however, it is never quite clear to the empiricist if "the People" do or can reach an understanding.
Most political action finds certain organized groups acting upon an otherwise passive "public" and activating
some or all of them into making or joining a collective
action in decision making. The activist groups do not
always act fairly and they do not necessarily attempt to
be objective or even rational in their approach but,
rather, they propagandize and manipulate fact to their
own advantage while talking of making government responsible to "the People."
The question of individuals vs. groups become less
an academic problem, less a question of political theory,
when it moves to the level of what a constitution ought
and ought not to be. In the case of Minnesota's Constitution, like that of many states, one of the practical questions is whether the constitution ought to be written for
certain group advantages. It, of course, should be remembered that most citizens are members of groups, and
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these groups at times may work at cross political purposes. Unfortunately, if one assumes that a constitution
should serve the people as individuals and not as members of groups, the weight of evidence is that in practice
this is not the case with much of the Minnesota Constitution. Too many sections of the Constitution apply particularly to "special" interests or, in the past have
worked to the advantage of "special" interests, regardless
of the original purposes or intents. Some examples well
prove the point:
1. railroads-under Article IV, sec. 32, there can be
no change in the gross earnings tax by the legislature except by a vote of the people approving the change;
2. teachers-under Article VIII certain school funds
are set up for education; under Article IX, sec. lA, 40
per cent of the occupation tax is placed in the permanent
school fund, while 10 per cent goes to the permanent
University fund;
3. veterans-Article XX granted authority to pass a
veterans bonus, while Article IX, sec. IB set aside one
per cent of the occupation tax to pay the veterans bonus;
4. motor vehicle operators-under Article XVI, secs.
9 and 10, highways are the recipients of all revenues
from motor vehicle taxation and motor fuel taxation.
A side effect of this habit of writing into the constitution the exact purposes for which certain taxes can be
used is to encourage the legislature, under pressure of
special interests, to pass tax laws that limit the use of
certain kinds of tax revenues to specific purposes, such
as income taxes solely for educational purposes ( mainly
going to teacher and school administrator salaries),
hunting and fishing fees only for the use or welfare of
the special interests of those who hunt and fish or occupations that supply the sportsmen, etc. The end result
is that the flexibility of the legislature to deal with the
total tax picture is impaired, and secondly, certain special interests enjoy a distinct advantage over other
groups for the use of much of tax dollar.
Finally, it might be noted that the question of what
groups merit special consideration and protection in a
constitution can prove to be most difficult even for a
body set up to study and recommend a revised constitution. A case at point is the highly respected Constitutional Commission of Minnesota of 1948. It recommended section 32 (a) of Article IV, the gross earnings
tax on railroads in lieu of certain other taxes, be changed
so that there no longer be a requirement that the voters
approve any change in the rate of the gross earnings tax.
The reasons given by the commission was that "it does
not believe that the railroads as an industry are today
entitled to a constitutional tax protection denied to all
other corporations and individuals. To the commission's
knowledge no other state constitution requires a referendum to change the rate or method of taxation of a railroad corporation" (Constitutional Commission of Minnesota, 1948: 34) . But, alas, when the Commission
canie to the question of taxation of taconite, it recommended a change in Article IX, sec. IA (the occupation tax), to read that there could be no change in the
rate of taxation of taconite or the occupation of produc56

ing it, except by a two thirds vote of each house of the
legislature! The rationale for the difference between railroads and taconite was that the taconite industry needed
to "be encouraged to make the necessary investments"
from which "the State and the people of the State will
gain immeasurable benefits," and also because it "is a
new industry requiring tremendous capital investment in
processing plants" (Constitutional Commission of Minnesota, 1948: 54-5). The commission did not mention
whether other iron mining states did this in their constitutions ( although it painstakingly noted that other
states did not give railroads special protection), or how
long this should be a provision within the Constitution.
Precisely the same arguments could have been made
concerning the railroads in the 19th century: it was a
new industry and it required tremendous amounts of
capital.
Revision by Amendment
Minnesota citizens, either individually or collectively,
seem not to be satisfied with the Constitution of the
state. Since 1920, 65 amendments have been proposed
to the voters in the 22 elections that have taken place. 8
This means that an average of three amendments were
presented to the voters each election. The average is
even higher for. the years since 1948, when 29 amendments were offered to the voters in the 8 elections, or an
average of nearly three and two thirds amendments
(3.625) per election. Only,once, in 1946, has no amendment been offered to the voters and this is more likely
an effect of the war than anything else. The fewest
amendments came in 1940 and 1944, when only one
amendment was on the ballots. The most amendments
that the voter has had to deliberate on were five and this
has occurred on three occasions since 1920 (in 1924,
1934 and 1952).
The general willingness of the typical voter t6 change
the Constitution can be seen from the fact that 56 or 86
per cent of the 65 amendments placed on the ballot have
received a majority of the votes actually cast on the
amendments, in marked contrast to the 33 or 51 per
cent that have carried. The reason for the 50 per cent
rate of adoption is the effect of the amendment adopted
in 1898 which required a majority of all those who vote
in the election to approve an amendment so that failure
to vote on an amendment is the same as a no vote. For
the period beginning in 1920, it was not until 1932 that
an amendment failed to receive a majority of all who
voted on it. This was repeated again in 1936, and in
1948 when three of the four amendments failed to receive a majority of the votes, and in 1950 when two of
the three failed.

Presidential and off-year elections. An analysis of the
success of proposed amendments since 1920 in terms of
the differing chances that a proposed amendment seems
to have in presidential as opposed to off-year elections
is revealing. Table 1 presents this information.
• This included the 1920 referendum, under Article IV, section 32a, which required that the voters approve any increase
in taxes for railroads.
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TABLE 1. The number and percentage of proposed amendments
that are passed and rejected, by presidential and offyear elections.
Number

Number
passed

Percent Number Percentage
passed rejected rejected

1920-62
65
33
35 (53.8) 14
30 ( 46.2) 19

50.8
40.0
63.3

32
21
11

49.2
60.0
36.7

1948-62
Amendments offered -29
16
Presidential elections 16 (55.2) 6
Off-year elections
13 (44.8) 10

55.2
37.5
76.9

13
10
3

44.8
62.5
23.1

Amendments offered
Presidential elections
Off-year elections

that the chances of passage· are markedly greater during
these elections than presidential elections.
Table 3 analyzes averages by elections, the "yes" vote,
and the degree of political alienation as measured in
non-voting for all amendments, passed amendments and
rejected amendments. Since 1948, several changes have
taken place. For one thing, there has been a decline in
the "yes" vote of those who actually vote on the amendments. And there has been, as noted before, a decline in
the average political alienation or non-voting. This suggests, then that political alienation, expressed in the past
in non-voting, now has transferred to a direct negative
vote: the "when in doubt, vote 'no'" reasoning.

Of the 65 amendments placed before the voters from
1920-1962, 51 per cent passed. More amendments were
offered during presidential elections yet only 40 per
cent passed. During the off-year elections, however,
fewer amendments were offered, yet 63 per cent passed.
For the more recent period of 1948 to 1962, the relation between presidential and off-year elections is even
more marked. More amendments were offered during
presidential elections but only 37.5 per cent passed. During the off-year elections 77 per cent passed. This would
seem to indicate quite markedly that the best chances
for passage of amendments comes during off-year elections. It also suggests that during presidential elections
the voters' interests are turned more to national politics
and, as a result, state issues are less likely to come to the
minds of the voters who then either vote "no" or fail to
vote on amendments.

TABLE 3. "Yes" votes as a percentage of the total votes, of
those who actually vote on proposed amendments,
and of political alienation, on proposed amendments.*

Political alienation or non-voting. Another change
that has occurred during the last four decades is the
ma,rked decline in· political alienation in terms of nonvoting on proposed amendments. Table 2 indicates that
there has been a constant and marked decline in nonvoting on proposed amendments. For example, in the
1920 through 1928 elections, an average of 27.8 per
cent of the voters failed to vote on proposed amendments, while in the 1950 through 1958 elections, the
average had dropped to 16.2 per cent, a decline that has
continued through the first two elections in the '60s.
Generally speaking, there is a slightly higher degree of
political alienation or non-voting during off-year elections than during presidential elections, despite the fact

Amendment types and voter responses. Some types of
amendments have a better chance of passing than others.
This is demonstrated by Table 4. The most numerous
type of amendment during the period 1920 through 1962
concerned taxation and debt. Some 24 amendments (37
per cent) were of this nature; 13 or 54 per cent passed
while non-voting averaged 21 per cent.
The next most numerous type was a general category
that might for brevity's sake be declared the "mechanics
of government" for it included terms of office of state
officials and judges, length of legislative sessions, elections and city charters ( the latter might have been in a
category by itself).
One of the most unpopular amendment types either
sought to expand or otherwise define governmental powers and functions. Eight amendments offered some special payment, service or consideration to special interests although this does not imply that no public benefit
was involved. The percentage of non-voters is relatively
high.
Nine amendments dealt with highways, vehicles and
highway taxes. Political alienation or non-voting was
the lowest of all amendment groups, amounting only
to 17 per cent. Amendments relating to schools were
relatively few. Education amendments had a high success ratio, with three of the four or 75 per cent passing,
and with a very low political alienation. The least popu- '
lar, although like the schools the sample is limited, related to those seeking different methods of revising or

TABLE 2. The average political alienation (non-voting) by decade, presidential and off-year elections.

Decade

Non-voting
Per cent

Non-voting in
Presidential
Elections-%

Non-voting in
Off-year
elections-%

1920-28
1930-38
1940-48
1950-58
1960-62

27.8*
28.4
22.0
18.6
16.2

28.1
25.8
20.7
18.5
19.2

26.9
30.0
26.0
18.6
12.4

* The reason for the lower average is due to the tremendous
interest in the good roads or "Babcock" amendment of 1920
when 91 per cent of the total voters voted on the amendment
(non-voting thus was only 9 per cent, the lowest ever recorded).
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Average yes
vote as %
of total vote

Average yes Average political
vote as % alienation in terms
of amendment
of non-voting
vote
( in per cent)

All amendments
Passed amendments
Rejected amendments

1920-62
50.3
59.5
41.2

64.9
73.0
57.5

23.4
19.4
27.5

All amendments
Passed amendments
Rejected amendments

1948-62
50.5
59.7
39.9

62.1
70.9
50.6

18.2
15.8
21.1

* While non-voting has declined, the "yes" vote as a per cent
of total vote has remained constant, suggestion that the politically alienated non-voter has become a "no" voter.
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TABLE 4. Amendment types and voter responses on proposed amendments. *

Types of Amendments•
1920-62

Number
of
Amend-

Number
Rejected-%

Average
Political
Alienation
in Terms
of nonvoting-%

Types as a percent
of All (65)
amendments
proposed-(% No.)

1nents

Number
Passed-%

Taxation and debt

24

13-54

11-46

21.5

37 (24 of 65)

Terms, sessions, elections
and city charters

19

11-55

9-45

23.3

29 ( 19 of 65)

Services, payments, or
considerations to special interests

8

4-50

4-50

25.8

12 ( 8 of 65)

Expanding or defining
gov'tal powers & functions

11

4-36

7-64

30.2

17 (11 of 65)

rvfethod of revising or
amending Constitution

4

1-25

3-75

24.8

6 ( 4 of 65)

Highways, vehicles and
highway taxes

9

5-56

4-44

16.9

14 ( 9 of 65)

Schools

4

3-75

1-25

18.2

6 ( 4 of 65)

,:, Some of the 65 proposed amendments are found in two or more categories.

amending the constitution. Four were of this kind, but
only one passed.
Is Revision by Amendment Enough?
An examination of these last 40 years of revising the
Constitution by amendments brings to mind one final
question: Is revision by amendment enough? The
amendment record can not be said to be either impressive or dismally short of the mark. From 1920 to 1962,
51 per cent of the proposed amendments have passed.
Since 1948 the record is somewhat better (55 per cent).
Opponents to revision by convention decry its cumbersomeness and the time and energy that it takes, with the
initiation and the culmination being frequently measured
in years. Still, revision by amendment alone is a long,
tedious and not necessarily successful process. There has
long been recognized a need for revision if the recommendations of the 1948 Constitutional Commission of
Minnesota can be judged as a standard of measure.
Given the tremendous majority that is required to secure
the passage of an amendment, change of a substantive
nature is discouraged. Furthermore, the requirement that
a majority of all voters who vote in the election, and not
simply those who vote on the amendment, in fact,
amounts to almost the same as a two thirds majority, if
it is statistically analyzed. 0 If there was a more reasonable requirement of even a 60 per cent voter approval
on proposed amendments, as applies to a proposed submission of a revised or new constitution to the voters
(since the adoption of the 1954 amendment) then 50 of
the 65 proposed amendments since 1920- would have
been adopted.
To this writer's view, when the proposed amendments
of the last 40 odd years are examined, many fail to meet
"If a two thirds vote had been required on all proposed
amendments since 1920, 35 of the 65 would have passed, two
more than actually did pass under the severe handicap of the
present provision.
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the crucial needs of a sound and flexible state government in a highly technical and demanding age. Severe
limits are placed on the ability of the govemm~n~ _to
meet with a measure of competence and respons1b1hty
the overall problems of taxation, governmental leadership and legislative responsibility. An "executive department" with one responsible chief executive does not
exist. The legislature has been granted an extension of
its session length by 30 days, but it still lacks the power
and flexibility that are necessary now and will become
more so in the future, especially in relation to its taxing
and spending powers. The amendment approach to modification and change could be an effective one, but the
record to date is not impressive, even admitting some
gains in the past 15 years.
One of the major complaints made by critics of national government has been that in using its taxing powers it has limited the sources of state revenue. Some have
opposed the use of federal funds through gran~s-i~-a_id
and similar national-state programs because 1t limits
state action. Leave the states alone, they suggest. The
reason, in part, for these programs of federal grants and
funds although by no means the only one, for states are
handicapped in setting taxes by competition for industry, the general tax base and the wealth of the state - is
that the states have placed themselves into financial
straitjackets. The national government has twice settled the question of its taxing powers; in 1787 when it
granted broad powers to the Congress and, again, in
1912, when the 16th amendment was adopted, an
amendment that by itself might not have been necessary
for it is quite likely that the Supreme Court would have
overturned its "century of error" decision of 1895 at
some later date. Minnesota has not been so fortunate.
Since 1920 no less than 24 amendments to the State
Constitution have been proposed dealing with taxes and
debts; this represents 37 per cent of all amendments preThe Minnesota Academy of Science

sented to the voters. When the critics of the federal taxing and spending authority blame the national government, it is because they simply have not examined the
many causes of state fiscal difficulties.
Minnesota should consider seriously the calling of a
constitutional convention for revision of its Constitution.
This seems especially necessary in view of the circumstance that prevailed in the frontier era and the development of Minnesota's state Constitution by the violently
split factions of 1858. There is today a greater opportunity for calm and deliberative consideration that would
allow a modern convention to "work its will." Nearly
40 years ago Anderson (1927:215) wrote . . . "it is
safe to predict that some day, in the near or far future, another constitutional convention will be held in
Minnesota, but before that event it may be necessary to
amend the convention section in order to remove some
of the constitutional obstacles which now prevent the
calling of one." 10
Obviously, there is opposition by some individuals
and groups to the calling of such a convention. Some
fear it because of the -fear of change, others because
they might lose some special privilege and still others,
who do not fully understand the major difficulties and
suspicions that existed in the 19th century in the drawing of a state constitution. These are essentially unnecessary fears. Shall the state fear flexible government? adequate legislative and executive powers? adequate and
flexible taxing powers? substantive and procedural protections to citizens? responsible and responsive government?
The major obstacle to the calling of a constitutional
convention is that citizens generally and the legislature
particularly must be convinced that change is necessary
and desirable. Public spirited individuals and groups
must continue to press upon the public mind that all is
not well with the state· Constitution, that there is much

°For a different point of view that takes the position that the
gains of revision through amendment are substantial and encouraging, and the only likely approach. given the practicalities
of constitutional politics, see Mitau, 1960.
1
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that is to be gained in a revised Constitution and, hopefully, revision can still best be obtained through the calling of a special convention. The state has nothing to lose
but certain inflexible, archaic and 19th century ( even
20th century) chains that are not found in the Constitution of the United States. Nor is the proposal a radical
or even a "liberal" one. It suggests a return to the collective wisdom of the original "conservative" framers of
the national Constitution who so well understood the
needs and merits of brevity, generality, flexibility and
adequacy of power for the executive, legislative and
judicial branches of government, and the rights and
claims that citizens have against the government.
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